

## THE COLD WAR TENSION IN GREECE AND THE CONTINUATION OF BRITISH RULE IN CYPRUS, 1945-1950

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### Abstract

Cyprus officially became a British Crown Colony in 1925. However, the Greek Cypriots had consistently fought for enosis which was a union with Greece. As the biggest population in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots felt that Cyprus was qualified to be a part of the Greece state; hence they revolted against British rule. This paper will expound on the decision of the British to remain in Cyprus despite the Greek Cypriots' effort for enosis. The existing literature concerning this issue illustrates that the strategic geographical location of Cyprus, being near to the British communication route to the Middle East and the Eastern Empire, is the apparent reason for the British retaining its sovereign power in Cyprus. The main objective of this paper is to examine the other reason for Britain to remain in Cyprus that is still absent from the literature. This paper has focused on the perspective of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his Foreign Office through the method of the archival research of British records such as Bevin's Private Papers (FO800), the Cabinet Office Papers (CAB), the Foreign Office Papers (FO371), the Colonial Office files (CO), the Defence Ministry Papers (DEFE) and the House of Commons Parliamentary Debate (HANSARD). The finding shows that the Cold War tension in Greece, which was the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), had encouraged Bevin and the Foreign Office to reject any proposals or initiatives that favoured the idea of Cyprus being returned to Greece. There was a possibility of the communist insurgents took over Greece given they had successfully formed a provisional government in northern Greece. Bevin worried that Cyprus would also turn communist if it was ceded to Greece during this crucial time. This matter would also endanger the British geostrategic in Cyprus. This was the most likely event that Bevin wanted to avoid happening.

**Keywords:** British Crown Colony, Cyprus, *Enosis*, Bevin, the Greek Civil War

### Introduction

British rule in Cyprus began when the Cyprus Convention was signed at the Congress of Berlin in June 1878. Article I of the Cyprus Convention between Britain and Turkey stated that Britain was given consent by the Sublime Porte to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus in order to enable Britain to make necessary provisions for executing its engagement in helping the Sublime Porte against possible Russian aggression.<sup>1</sup> The Convention was abrogated by Britain in 1914 when the Ottoman Empire decided to join the First World War in favour of the Central Powers. Cyprus, therefore, was annexed to the British Empire. The new successor to the Sublime Porte, Kemalist Turkey 'recognised the annexation of Cyprus to the British Empire under the terms of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) whereby, she also renounced all rights to former Ottoman territories outside her frontier.'<sup>2</sup>

In 1925, Cyprus became a British Crown Colony. The British government who officially became a sovereign power in Cyprus in 1878 had encountered problems with the Greek Cypriots who demanded *enosis* (union) with Greece. Cyprus' inhabitants strongly asked for self-determination from the British government, while the Greek Cypriots

demanded *enosis* and both demands occurred simultaneously. *Enosis* was the Greek Cypriots' aspiration for a union with Greece. According to George H. Kelling, 'Greek Cypriots felt themselves part of the Greek nation and their aspirations for *enosis* were part of the same movement which created Greece and added Crete (and for that matter Athens) to the Greek state.'<sup>3</sup> Apparently, the Greek Cypriots were inspired by the *Megali idea* (Grand Design) of Greece. This idea was an irredentist concept of Greek nationalism that aimed for the establishment of a Greek state in the Eastern Mediterranean by encompassing territories in Europe and Western Asia Minor, which were estimated by Athens as ethnic Greek-inhabited areas. Eighty per cent of the Cyprus population were the Greek Cypriots.

As the biggest population in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots felt that Cyprus was qualified to be a part of the Greece state. This was the reason why the Greek Cypriots had consistently fought for *enosis*. Their emotion for *enosis* began to be formed during the era of Ottoman rule and was manifested later at the time of the British occupation of Cyprus. Initially, the British government did not take these matters seriously, especially the *enosis* question. As a result, in 1931 the Greek Cypriots revolted against the British ruling in Cyprus. Ever since then, the sentiment for *enosis* had gradually developed stronger and was fused into an insurrection against the British administration in Cyprus. Evidently, the Cyprus dispute between the British administration in Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots was instigated by *enosis*.

Greece was also inevitably affected by the question of *enosis* because it was Greece that the Greek Cypriots wanted Cyprus to unite with. The Greek government's reaction to *enosis* was different from time to time. At the beginning of irredentist nationalism, Greece seemed to be pleased with *enosis*. Moreover, Athens was already prepared for *enosis* with Cyprus. However, after Greece was defeated by a Turkish National Movement in Asia Minor in 1922, Greece's ambition for the *Megali idea* had to be dismissed. This new development had also affected Greece's competence in supporting the Greek Cypriots' plead for *enosis*.

In addition, after 1923, Greece's persistence in having a good relationship with Britain influenced Greece to put the question of *enosis* aside. Clearly, Greece refused to jeopardise its relationship with Britain by asking for the right to take over Cyprus. When the Greek Cypriots revolted in 1931, the Greek government was reluctant to back them up and firmly reminded them that Greece had nothing to do with their dispute with the British administration in Cyprus.<sup>4</sup> However, Greek's demand over Cyprus revived again after the Second World War ended:

"Greece's participation in World War II as Britain's only fighting ally during the difficult period of October 1940 – May 1941 again raised the hopes of the Greek Cypriots. Britain, however, refused to consider Greek requests to give Cyprus, or (even temporarily) part of it, to Greece so that the king and his government (in exile after May 1941) could reside there. Instead, London hinted to the Greeks that it might discuss *enosis* after the war".<sup>5</sup>

The British government had decided to consider *enosis* after the Second World War ended. The most impressive aspect of *enosis*, from the British government's perspective, was its durability. Since the *enosis* started, the Greek Cypriots continually pressed their demands for *enosis*. The matter became complicated during the post-Second World War era because Greece was fond of *enosis*. This new development forced the ministers and officials in the

British government to reconsider Britain's position in Cyprus and re-evaluated the British strategic interest in Cyprus.

This paper aims to identify Britain's perspective, specifically that of the Foreign Office and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, on Britain's decision to remain in Cyprus during the early Cold War period, 1945 to 1947, despite the Greek Cypriots' pressure that Cyprus be handed back to Greece. This paper is not about the *enosis* movement in Cyprus, but relatively it pays attention to the decision made by Bevin and the Foreign Office in maintaining British sovereignty although the Greek Cypriots and Greece kept demanding *enosis*. This paper adopts a qualitative approach that employs the perusal of the British archival records, particularly FO371 (Foreign Office Papers), FO800 (Bevin's Private Papers), CO (Colonial Office files), CAB (Cabinet Office Papers), DEFE (Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers) and the House of Commons Parliamentary Debate (HANSARD) from the viewpoint of policy-making and diplomatic history during the Cold War period. Those archival records used in this paper were substantially retrieved from London National Archives. In showing how the local dynamics in Greece – that Greece suffered from the Greek Civil War – also had a crucial impact on Bevin's decision to dismiss *enosis* and thus maintain British rule in Cyprus, this paper extracts, compares and analyses the data from Bevin's Private Papers (FO800) that hold Bevin's view regarding Cyprus, Greece and *enosis*, and the data from the Foreign Office (FO371) that hold records regarding Greece and Cyprus.

Both issues of the Cyprus question, which are British strategic interest in Cyprus and the Cyprus ethnic dispute, coincided with a series of difficulties involving foreign matters that basically happened because of the economic depression at the beginning of post-Second World War in Britain. These difficulties included the declining status of Britain as a Great Power, the problem to maintain Britain's military commitment to overseas theatre in the early years of Cold War tension, and the struggle to maintain Britain's privilege in the Middle East region. All these circumstances influenced Bevin to reassess Britain's strategic interest in Cyprus and also helped Bevin in determining a decision over Cyprus' future status, especially in the formative years of the Cold War.

### **Greece's Attitude and Turkey's Reaction Towards the *Enosis* Movement**

The question of *enosis* was also a reason for the main disagreement between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. According to Norasmahani Hussain, 'these two ethnic groups became rivals because they had different ideas for the future settlement of Cyprus.'<sup>6</sup> The Turkish Cypriots preferred Cyprus to be annexed to Turkey instead of a union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots started to oppose *enosis* in a more forceful and stern manner after the Second World War ended in 1945. They apparently reacted against the revival of *enosis* that was pursued by the Greek Cypriots together with the Greek government in Athens. Ever since the Cyprus dispute which was previously a dispute between the Cypriots and the British administration had gradually turned into an ethnic dispute between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. At this stage, the Turkish government became involved as a new party in the Cyprus ethnic dispute. Accordingly, it was because the Turkish Cypriots strongly wished for Cyprus to be annexed to Turkey.

Greece, in pursuit of *enosis* during the post-Second World war period, was claimed by the British government and the Turkish government as trying to revive the *Megali idea* that had been abandoned before. However, this perception was incongruous because the re-

establishment of a great Greek state could not be achieved by the annexation of Cyprus alone.<sup>7</sup> As a matter of fact, Greece supported *enosis* during this time because it was thought that the Turkish government had maintained the policy that was produced by the Kemalist government in the 1920s which renounced any intervention or claims with regard to Cyprus.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, Greece was convinced that its decision about *enosis* would not bother Turkey. However, Greece had made a mistake by not realising that the current government in Ankara had regained its interest in Cyprus. The new attitude of Turkey towards Cyprus was only realised by Greece when the Turkish government strongly opposed *enosis*. Turkey's intervention in the ethnic dispute in Cyprus generated conflict and tension with Greece. As the sovereign power in Cyprus, Britain's involvement in this bitter conflict was inevitable.

### **Britain, *Enosis* and British Geostrategic in Cyprus**

Cyprus had caused trouble for Britain since it was placed under British colonial rule. The political and diplomatic problems which occurred were basically because of *enosis*. However, Cyprus was a valuable asset for Britain because of its strategic geographical location. Cyprus is situated in the eastern Mediterranean, which is at the crossroad of the sea routes of three continents: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This position contributed to the strategic significance of Cyprus. This strategic value of Cyprus made it really important on the international political scene. In the course of the Second World War, Cyprus was utilised to support military operations in South-Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa as a refuelling station, an airbase and a naval support centre. Cyprus was also used as a military defence because there was a threat of attacks through Turkey.<sup>9</sup> As Cyprus played some part in the Second World War, it later became a secondary base that was useful for Britain in the war effort.<sup>10</sup> This was demonstrated during the 1956 Suez crisis when Britain used Cyprus as a base for launching an attack on the Suez Canal.<sup>11</sup>

According to Simon Ball, although British bases on Cyprus were too far to the east to be useful in the usual run of the Mediterranean operations, these bases, however, were perfectly placed for use against ships trying to make a run from Greece to Syria.<sup>12</sup> Apparently, the strategic geographical location of Cyprus was a valuable asset that attracted Britain to maintain its control over Cyprus, although the Greek Cypriots strongly demanded *enosis*. Nonetheless, the retention of British rule in Cyprus became harder to sustain after the Second World War ended due to the Greek Cypriots and the Greek government's diplomatic pressure for *enosis*. This circumstance caused the British government to be torn between continuing British control in Cyprus and abandoning British strategic value of Cyprus by agreeing to *enosis*.

As a matter of fact, the question of the future status of Cyprus was a continuing problem for the British government. This matter troubled the British government from December 1940 until June 1941. This issue was triggered by the ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Palaret who contacted the Foreign Office and asked them to consider handing Cyprus over to Greece after the Second World War ended because he believed that was a good option in order to have a better relationship with Greece: 'I do not see how our position there can ever be satisfactory whereas by doing this we should win the undying gratitude of our new (and valuable) ally.'<sup>13</sup> Coincidentally, Palaret's suggestion resembled the Foreign Office's belief and shortly afterwards, the Foreign Office had put forward this plan to the Cabinet. Edward Warner of the Southern Department specified in his minutes that Britain should give Cyprus to Greece in exchange for a base at Suda Bay.<sup>14</sup> The Foreign Office view

was opposed by the Colonial Office. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill regarded Cyprus an important British possession although it was a military backwater.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, Churchill felt Cyprus should be held for a few more years, and the Chiefs of Staff [hereafter COS] meanwhile had made no decision regarding this matter.

Since there was no unity of opinion on this issue, the director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Arnold Toynbee was directed by Sir Orme Sargent, who at that time was the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Southern Department, to study the future status of Cyprus. The institute's consideration of the issue was parallel with the Foreign Office's view that Cyprus would best be ceded to Greece.<sup>16</sup> Sir Orme Sargent, therefore, prepared a proposal for the Cabinet on the matter, but the Colonial Office felt that the decision on Cyprus was a mistake and prepared a counter-argument paper for the Cabinet against conceding Cyprus or discussing the issue with the Greek government.<sup>17</sup> This brought an awkward moment in the Cabinet, and the Cabinet thus 'decided not to raise the issue, but if necessary to tell the Greeks of British willingness to consider Cyprus as part of the overall post-war peace settlement.'<sup>18</sup> The disagreement over the future status of Cyprus was eventually solved by the Prime Minister in the Colonial Office's favour in June 1941. In a note to Anthony Eden who was the Foreign Secretary at that time, Churchill stressed that Britain should not cede an inch of British territory during the war, and Cyprus, therefore, must remain British.<sup>19</sup> It seems that Churchill's personal intervention in the dispute over Cyprus' future status had seemingly managed to resolve the problem at that time.

Nevertheless, Cyprus' headache over its future status had troubled the British government again after the Second World War ended in 1945 but this time, the matter had to be confronted by the newly elected Labour government. The beginning of the Labour Party as a new government indicated that the new era of colonial policy in Cyprus was about to begin. The Labour ministers became new protagonists in the Cyprus question. A triumvirate of ministers in the Cabinet committee was Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Colonial Secretary George H. Hall (Arthur Creech Jones replaced Hall in 1946). The other protagonists in the Cyprus question were the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the COS. These three recognised bodies of policymaking were responsible for assisting Cabinet committees, which were on the top of the hierarchy in making many important decisions by producing concerted views and materials for them. Sometimes, the Cabinet committees dealt with the Cyprus question directly without any input from the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the COS.<sup>20</sup> The Labour government formulated British policy towards Cyprus from the top down. The ministers in the Cabinet committee made most of the decisions on Cyprus and not the officials from the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office or the COS. Within the Cabinet committees, Bevin was a centrally important figure, and most of the decisions regarding the Cyprus question were decided by him.<sup>21</sup>

### **Bevin and the Future Status of Cyprus**

At the beginning of Bevin's responsibility in handling the matters regarding Cyprus, Bevin seemed indecisive about the best decision for Cyprus' future status. He kept changing his mind on the issue. At first, Bevin agreed with the Foreign Office's suggestion that Cyprus should be handed to Greece. As a matter of fact, Bevin fully supported a strong British overseas presence and had no intention of giving up Britain's commitments too quickly although the Chancellor of Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, strongly urged Bevin and the Foreign

Office to cut Britain's overseas expenditure.<sup>22</sup> However, in the case of Cyprus, Bevin felt that Cyprus naturally belonged to Greece. Besides, Bevin also accepted the Foreign Office's justification for it was a proper gesture in enhancing Britain's relation with Greece in return for the base rights in Cyprus.

The Foreign Office consistently pursued the idea of handing Cyprus over to Greece since this issue was raised by Palairet in 1940. The Foreign Office and Bevin also had Attlee on their side. Attlee's decision to discontinue British rule in Cyprus was of no surprise because he passionately championed the idea of abandoning British national interest in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.<sup>23</sup> Based on Attlee's unfavourable attitude towards these two significant regions, it was natural for Attlee to have less interest in keeping Cyprus further under the British Empire because Cyprus which was located in the Mediterranean and close to the Middle East was regarded by Attlee as a small island that had limited significant value to Britain at that time.

However, Bevin's standpoint which was in the Foreign Office's favour was later shaken. Bevin started to become uncertain about giving up Cyprus to Greece when the situation in Greece deteriorated further due to the sequence of invasion, occupation, resistance, reprisals and civil war.<sup>24</sup> Greece became ineffectual because of these crises, and Bevin expected that Greece would not be able to guarantee Cyprus' security if Cyprus was conceded to Greece at that time. Therefore, Bevin began to believe that Cyprus should remain British. Nevertheless, once again the ambassador in Athens, who this time was Sir Reginald Leeper, convinced the Foreign Office that the return of Cyprus to Greece was the best way to strengthen Britain's position in Greece.<sup>25</sup> Obviously, Leeper's argument over this issue echoed Palairet's concerns in 1940. The intervention of Leeper in this issue caused Bevin to query again whether the continuation of British occupation in Cyprus was the right decision. In order to take the right direction in determining the future status of Cyprus, Bevin requested the views of the COS regarding this matter.

The COS' opinion on this issue was totally different to that of the Foreign Office. They considered that the withdrawal of Britain from Cyprus was wrong. They stated that Cyprus was 'the only British possession in the Middle East area and the only territory in the Middle East where such measures as they consider necessary for defence can be carried out unfettered by treaties.'<sup>26</sup> Hence, the COS highly recommended the retention of British control in Cyprus. This consideration was basically driven by the island's proximity to the Middle East, a region of vital consequence to Britain and the British Empire. The COS was worried that the Soviet Union would be a serious military threat to the Middle East, and this action would definitely endanger the British position in that region.<sup>27</sup> In order to secure British power in the Middle East, and have a strategic military defence if the future war with the Soviet Union broke, the COS, therefore, believed the maintenance of British control in Cyprus could support these plans successfully. This remarkable answer from the COS over the future status of Cyprus managed to convince Bevin that the British sovereign's extension in Cyprus was a wise option.

The COS defined the future danger and the pre-emptive value of Cyprus to British strategy in the Middle East in the report to Bevin, although they admitted at that time that Britain still regarded Cyprus as an island that had a very limited strategic value.<sup>28</sup> As their assessment of Cyprus' significant value to Britain's foreign affairs was accepted by Bevin, it can be argued that this report was a crucial turning point for Cyprus to be regarded as one of the valuable assets of Britain. It seemed to be the case that the major British interest in the

Middle East increased the importance of Cyprus as one of the territories directly under British rule.<sup>29</sup> It would be more accurate to say that because of the strategic geographical location of Cyprus, it became a valuable asset for the British Middle Eastern position. Ever since then, when dealing with and discussing Cyprus and its foreign matters, the question of the Middle East was also considered by the British government.

Although Bevin was fond of keeping Cyprus under British rule for a longer period of time, he appeared increasingly hesitant to turn the decision into an official policy. This was because Bevin wanted to make a careful and thorough consideration of this issue due to a revival of Greece's interest in *enosis* since the post-Second World War era began. Bevin was well aware that the decision to maintain British occupation in Cyprus would totally deny Greece the opportunity to be united with Cyprus. This matter could have been a catalyst for the rapid deterioration in the relationship between these two countries. Bevin wanted to preserve British command in Cyprus without having a conflict with Greece. It was important for Britain to have a good relationship with Greece because Greece was so important to the British Middle Eastern position.<sup>30</sup>

It was clear that Bevin was reluctant to jeopardise the British position in the Middle East by having severe disagreements with Greece over the island of Cyprus. Bevin had taken the question of *enosis* seriously into account before he made the final decision over the British strategic interest in Cyprus. It could not be denied that the issue of *enosis* had caused the question of British strategic interest in Cyprus to become more complicated for Bevin to deal with. Bevin was caught in a dilemma because either he agreed to the continuation of British rule in Cyprus or in support of *enosis*; both decisions would bring damaging implications on Britain's relationship with Greece and Britain's Middle Eastern position respectively.

Bevin treated the Cyprus question with great circumspection, and this manner had held Bevin up in producing an official document that verified the British extension of control in Cyprus. This caused immense frustrations to the Colonial Office because they really needed a black and white policy on Cyprus before any domestic arrangement for Cyprus could be made. Bevin's cautious attitude took him almost a year to reply to the Colonial Office regarding this matter. In September 1945, the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, Sir Arthur Dawe, pressed Bevin to make a prompt decision for he argued that if Bevin made Britain's position clear on the question of union with Greece, the Colonial Office would be better able to go forward with a policy of economic improvement, social welfare and constitutional advance.<sup>31</sup> 'After a prolonged and acrimonious bureaucratic controversy, Bevin finally, in September 1946, wrote that if the Colonial Office continued to insist on a declaration of sovereignty, there would be a showdown in the Cabinet.'<sup>32</sup> Therefore, Bevin suggested the Colonial Office to understand the situation of British foreign affairs on a broad range of issues. In Bevin's reply to the Colonial Office, he told the Colonial Secretary Hall that he had several strong reasons for his actions on the matter. Bevin emphasised that there was a connection between the Cyprus question and other foreign affairs issues. Bevin thought it was a wise decision by being extra cautious:

“Generally speaking, my feeling as regards to Cyprus is to let sleeping dogs lie and not to say anything at all about the island at this particular point. From the foreign affairs point of view I obviously do not want to complicate the already difficult situation in the Balkans and the

Middle East by starting a controversy about the future of Cyprus, when I have already so much on my plate in that part of the world".<sup>33</sup>

Based on Bevin's reply to Hall, it was clear that Bevin was determined to ensure that the retention of British rule in Cyprus would not affect other Britain's foreign affairs on the international stage, especially the relationship with Greece, and Britain's Middle Eastern position. Furthermore, Bevin explained that if Britain appeared to react too hurriedly on this matter, 'the Russian propaganda machine will use this opportunity to expound their theory that Britain is developing bases in the Eastern Mediterranean from which to attack the Soviet Union.'<sup>34</sup> Bevin also respectfully request that Hall and the officials in the Colonial Office to think about the Cyprus question from the Foreign Secretary's point of view, and hoped they appreciate that the most important question regarding this island that should be given priority was the foreign affairs aspect of Cyprus, not the local or its domestic aspect.<sup>35</sup>

Unfortunately, Bevin's justification for his delaying tactics in handling the Cyprus question failed to make the Colonial Office withdraw its pressure on him. The Colonial Office's eagerness to have a clear statement on whether Britain would stay in Cyprus caused conflict with Bevin. The Colonial Office took offence at Bevin's handling of the future status of British control in Cyprus by threatening that they would bring this issue to Parliament.<sup>36</sup> However, Bevin told the Colonial Office the effort was useless because he would make no change in his action because he was unprepared to make any official endorsement on this matter, and the Parliament would not proceed without it.<sup>37</sup> Nonetheless, the Colonial Office was relentless and they intended to resolve this without Bevin's presence. With great encouragement from Dawe, Hall brought this issue to the Cabinet on 8 July 1946. Bevin was absent because he was attending the Peace Conference in Paris. The Colonial Office passionately championed the notion of continuing British rule in Cyprus, and they really wanted a clear statement on this matter from the British government. Nevertheless, no progress could be made in Cyprus until they were convinced that Cyprus would remain British.<sup>38</sup> The Colonial Office's view was contrary to the Foreign Office. They strongly pressed the British government to discontinue British occupation in Cyprus. The Foreign Office's view on the Cyprus question remained the same as before. In April 1946, the official of the Southern Department, M. S. Williams defined the Foreign Office's view on this matter as below:

"... would damage our relations with Greece and undermine the position of the weak Governments which we have been trying to support. ... A statement rejecting Greek claims at a time when we were giving no support to Greek claims [elsewhere] would place an unnecessary strain on our relations with the Greek Government".<sup>39</sup>

The Foreign Office's opinion on this issue was really consistent and firm. Therefore, when the Colonial Office brought this matter to the Cabinet with the intention of settling it without Bevin's endorsement, the Foreign Office strongly criticised the Colonial Office for failing to consider the Cyprus question from a wide-ranging foreign affairs view. Although the Colonial Office had Bevin on their side, everyone was aware that Bevin had never approved any documents that stated Great Britain would stay in Cyprus. Without Bevin's approval, the Colonial Office had no power to take on the Foreign Office alone. As a result, the Colonial Office's proposal for obtaining a clear status about British rule in Cyprus was disapproved by the Cabinet.<sup>40</sup>



Eventually, the difficult moment between the Colonial Office and Bevin passed by peacefully when Jones, who was Bevin's subordinate during the Second World War period, became the new Colonial Secretary in October 1946. As Jones had previously served under Bevin, he apparently knew how to deal with the problem of the Colonial Office with Bevin. With his skills and experience, he managed to get the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office to compromise on a plan that could provide simultaneous satisfaction for both offices. This plan would allow the Colonial Office to run its policy on the domestic aspect of Cyprus and would allow Britain to maintain its presence in Cyprus without having to come up with an official statement on the matter. The content of the compromise involved a resolution of the Arch-episcopal matter, the return of the exiles of 1931, a ten-year development plan for Cyprus and a new constitution that could prevent *enosis*.<sup>41</sup>

Obviously, Jones succeeded in resolving the previous conflict between Hall and Bevin. The plan was as though it was the solution that Bevin was looking for so that he could discard the dilemma that troubled him on the Cyprus question. The plan could be defined as 'killing two birds with one stone' because it managed to settle two problems that had troubled Bevin earlier. Previously, Bevin was reluctant to make a final decision that would confirm the retention of British rule in Cyprus because he wanted to avoid a dispute with Greece, a country which strongly demanded *enosis* from Cyprus. His reluctance was driven by his desire to preserve the British Middle Eastern position by having a good relationship with Greece. This issue was really delicate for Bevin because if he wanted to strengthen the relationship between Britain and Greece so that the British position in the Middle East was secured, Bevin should consider granting *enosis* in order to please Greece.

However, by agreeing to *enosis*, Britain would have lost Cyprus, a valuable asset which was important for military defence and its Middle Eastern position. Clearly, either way, the decisions by Bevin in this Cyprus question would have negatively affected the British Middle Eastern position, such that Britain would not have let it happen at any cost. Fortunately, the plan by Jones struck the right note because it allowed Britain to remain in Cyprus without any official statement with Greece having no obvious reason to charge Britain with obstructing it from *enosis*. As a matter of fact, the plan had subtly avoided *enosis* from happening due to the implementation of a new constitution in Cyprus.

Although Jones's new plan seemingly managed to resolve the disagreement within the Cabinet of the British government over the first issue of the Cyprus question and managed to avoid a bad impression on Britain regarding the extension of British rule in Cyprus, the plan, however, failed to halt Greek Cypriots and Greece from fighting for *enosis*. The *enosis* campaign gained momentum in December 1946 and continued onward. It is worth mentioning that at the same time, the Greek Civil War in Greece, which broke out in March 1946, had gone from bad to worse by the end of the year 1946 and continued to be fought severely throughout 1947. These two matters, which are *enosis* and the Greek Civil War happened almost simultaneously, and Britain had extensive involvement in both of them. Apparently, these made British strategic interest in Cyprus extremely difficult to be handled by Bevin than before.

As mentioned earlier, the island of Cyprus was initially regarded by the British government as less valuable for Britain. This matter is noted by Kelling as follows:

Unfortunately, Cyprus was as indefensible as it was indispensable.  
The island was too close to the probable scenes of future conflict to be

an ideal base. It lacked harbours to stage major operations and was too small to furnish training facilities for more than a brigade.<sup>42</sup>

However, in 1945, the COS made new evaluations and expected Cyprus to be important for the British Middle Eastern position due to its contribution to the war effort during the Second World War. Bevin accepted COS' view positively and favoured for Cyprus to remain British. However, Bevin initially believed that Greece could provide Britain with better bases than Cyprus.<sup>43</sup> Bevin mentioned this consideration to Hall when he explained the reason for his delaying tactics in this Cyprus question before. Bevin was fully aware that the deal for bases in Greece depended on the stability of Greece and how friendly the relationship was between Greece and Britain. Bevin's anxiety about the possible dispute with Greece if Britain stayed in Cyprus was saved by Jones's new plan.

Nonetheless, Bevin's ambition for bases in Greece was seemingly difficult to achieve because of the Greek Civil War in Greece. If the Greek government army was defeated by the Democratic Army of Greece which was the Greek Communist Party's military branch in this Civil War; Greece would inevitably fall under communist control.<sup>44</sup> If Cyprus was ceded to Greece during that time, this island would also turn communist. These circumstances would have completely endangered the British position in the Middle East.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, Bevin became more certain that Cyprus should remain under Britain's possession. Obviously, the Greek Civil War, one of the Cold War's earliest conflicts had encouraged the British government to handle the Cyprus question more thoroughly.

As a result of growing fears of Greece becoming a communist nation, the British government became more convinced that Cyprus should stay within the British Empire. This was mainly because 'British sovereignty denied the island to a potential enemy.'<sup>46</sup> Accordingly, *enosis* seemed to be the question that could not be considered at all by the British government during this crucial time. Regrettably for Britain, the question of *enosis* emerged into a more menacing threat, although at that time Greece suffered from the Greek Civil War. Bevin was really furious and disappointed with the Greek government because of this issue. Bevin angrily pointed out that it would be senseless to return Cyprus to Greece if that country was on the point of going communist.<sup>47</sup> The Greek government's determination to fight for *enosis* was regarded by Bevin as mindless, and his displeasure was based on the fact that Britain was a major political, financial and military supporter of Greece in the Greek Civil War.<sup>48</sup>

### **The Cold War Tension in Greece and Bevin's Decision on Cyprus**

Britain provided the aforementioned support to Greece due to its two main policies that were implemented in Greece: firstly, political tutelage, and secondly, economic and military support. With regard to the first policy, Britain was determined to assist the Greeks in their political matters after the Treaty of Varkiza was signed in 12 February 1945. The Varkiza agreement gave the new administration of the Greek Royalist government authority to restore political and economic stability in Greece and also to conduct the plebiscite and free elections. Britain believed that if the new administration did not receive firm guidance on these matters, it would become a dictatorship, which could lead to a revival of EAM (*Ethnikón Apeleftherotikón Métopon* – National Liberation Front)/ ELAS (*Ellinikós Laikós Apeleftherotikós Stratósthe* – Greek People's Liberation Army) and a new left-wing revolt.<sup>49</sup>

From 1945 until the elections in March 1946, Britain's utmost priority in Greece was to support the policy of restoring law and order to ensure the establishment of a stable democratic government. This matter was mentioned by Bevin during the debate on his address concerning Greece in the House of Commons in August 1945:

“His Majesty’s Government adhere to the policy which they publicly supported when Greece was liberated. We then stated that our object was the establishment of a stable democratic Government in Greece, drawing its strength from the free expression of the people’s will. ... Unfortunately, this process was interrupted by an outbreak of violence. We then supported the policy of restoring law and order. The purpose of restoring order was to create the conditions in which the Greek people could determine the future of their own government and also settle the constitutional question”.<sup>50</sup>

The reason behind Britain's determination to take responsibility for giving political guidance to Greece was detailed in a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office. The memorandum stated that Britain required a stable and pro-British government in Greece and the sincere friendship of the Greek people if Britain wanted to maintain its political and military position in the Eastern Mediterranean and to safeguard its lines of communication with the East.<sup>51</sup> While pursuing political tutelage in Greece, Britain realised it was necessary to also provide economic and military support, given that political reform would fail if the desperate economic situation in Greece was not improved.<sup>52</sup> The civil war between the left-wing and right-wing groups seemed inevitable due to the Royalist government's hostile attitude towards EAM and its supporters.<sup>53</sup> It was essential that Britain provided military support, given that the Greek government's army was ill-trained and ill-equipped.

The political situation in Greece worsened after the election in March 1946 due to the outbreak of the Greek Civil War. The communist insurgents, notably the Communist Party of Greece (KKE – *Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas*), boycotted the internationally-recognised government that had been formed after the elections.<sup>54</sup> Later, the communist insurgents formed a provisional government, namely the Democratic Greek Government, in northern Greece. The insurgents fought the Greek government's army using guerrilla warfare, with logistical support from the neighbouring communist countries of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.<sup>55</sup> Britain's military aid was undoubtedly needed to support the Greek government's army in fighting the communist insurgents. By shouldering the responsibility of helping Greece bolster its defence, Britain hoped that the Greek royalist government would win the civil war. As noted by Bevin, Britain ‘accepted responsibility for giving guidance for the training and development of the Greek Army in order that they might be able to defend themselves against any attack from their neighbours.’<sup>56</sup> Nonetheless, the Greek government, the Greek Cypriots and a Cypriot communist party, which was the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL – *Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou*) had placed a stronger and more unified diplomatic pressure on the British government over the question of *enosis* in early 1947. Given that AKEL's predecessor did not support *enosis* before,<sup>57</sup> this new development in the *enosis* movement brought more anxiety to Britain.

Unfortunately for Britain, its economic crisis had gone from bad to worse by the beginning of the year 1947. The economic depression in Britain brought the British government to the conclusion that Britain could no longer continue giving economic and military aid to Greece. At first, the British government decided to make a massive reduction

in military expenditure in Greece, and at the same time hoped the United States would be willing to share the burden with Britain.<sup>58</sup> However, because the United States appeared hesitant to help Britain in this matter; Bevin decided to put pressure on the United States government by sending a letter to United States Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, which informed the United States that Britain would completely withdraw from Greece within six months.<sup>59</sup> As a result, on 12 March 1947, the United States announced that it agreed to help Greece and Turkey, and the \$400 million aid to these countries was given through the Truman Doctrine which became effective in May 1947.

Britain's decision to withdraw from Greece indicated that it would lose its right to use the bases in Greece freely. This circumstance would weaken the British position in the Middle East. Therefore, Britain was desperately in need to find another base in order to tighten its position in the Middle East. Apart from the fact that Cyprus was already under Britain's possession, Cyprus seemed to be the best option because of the island's proximity to the Middle East region. Before this, the closeness of Cyprus to the Middle East was arguably the reason that undermined the value of Cyprus. However, after the new realisation about Cyprus's strategic geographical location, Bevin became more convinced that the retention of British rule in Cyprus was the best alternative that could secure Britain's position in the Middle East. Even Attlee, who had previously been reluctant to keep Cyprus under the British Empire had changed his mind and supported the continuation of British rule in Cyprus.<sup>60</sup>

The Cold War tension in Greece had driven the British government to make a clear decision on British national interest in Cyprus. At this stage, except for the Foreign Office, the British government had made a unanimous decision over the Cyprus question that Cyprus must remain British. However, this was hard to achieve because of *enosis*. It could not be denied that the biggest obstacle for the British government was the question of *enosis*. In order to find the best solution on this matter, 'the Cabinet had authorised the Foreign Secretary to explore the possibilities of reaching an understanding with the Greek Government, that they would not raise for some years to come with the question of the status of Cyprus.'<sup>61</sup> It is worth highlighting here that the Cabinet's authorisation for Bevin to reach an agreement with the Greek government about *enosis* happened almost simultaneously with Bevin's decision to cut the military expenses in Greece.

It is possible to argue that, apart from the economic depression in Britain and Bevin's strategy to bring the United States into the Mediterranean and the Middle East affairs, Bevin's decision to stop supporting Greece might have been driven by his anger towards the Greek government's demand for *enosis* which he regarded as happening at an inappropriate time. This was because, after the announcement of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, made in March 1947, the Greek government seemed reluctant to raise the issue of *enosis* when it was approached by Bevin as requested by the Cabinet. Bevin accordingly told the Cabinet that was the best thing that could have been done because he believed that no satisfying solution could be reached if this issue were discussed with the Greek government at that time:

“If discussions were opened with them, they were bound to raise the question of the Cypriots’ right to determine their future status and, as we were not ready to give them any satisfaction on that point, they would have no incentive to reach any understanding with us. There was also a risk that any such discussions would become known and would provoke further agitation”.<sup>62</sup>

Based on this report to the Cabinet, it was apparent that the Greek government had toned down its claims on *enosis*. The Greek government’s new attitude would allow for the retention of British rule in Cyprus, without causing any hard feelings to Greece. The Greek government had later gradually stepped out of the question of *enosis* and had the intention to leave it in the Greek Cypriots’ hands. It seems that the Cold War crisis in Greece brought a favourable impact on the issue pertaining to the Cyprus question. The continuation of British sovereign rule in Cyprus became possible and necessary as Cyprus became more significant to British Middle Eastern position than before. This became a strong reason for Britain to keep Cyprus under British rule and rebuff any *enosis* movement. It is important to emphasise here that apart from the strategic geographical location of Cyprus, the most valuable asset of Cyprus was its military virtue: the Cyprus bases were not subjects to any treaties or understandings with any other countries.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, Britain could deploy its forces or military resources freely at any time without limitation because the base was absolutely under British authorisation.

What is more, the determination of Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS to retain British sovereignty in Cyprus was reinforced by Britain’s relative decline in the Middle East region and the loss of other regional assets, including Palestine in 1948, Egypt’s challenge to Britain over the Sudan and the Suez base, and Prime Minister Mohammed Mussadiq’s open defiance of Britain in Iran in the early 1950s.<sup>64</sup> Britain saw Cyprus as the better option and believed it should be retained under British possession. As noted by the War Office in 1951, ‘much instability has been caused in the Middle East by moves and rumours of moves of British troops. A stable and firmly held British stronghold on Cyprus is therefore of the greatest strategic importance.’<sup>65</sup> Moreover, according to the COS in April 1948, Cyprus could provide a base for military offensives against the Soviet Union in the midst of the Cold War, since the Soviet Union was within bomber range of the bases in Cyprus.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, it became one of the apparent motivations that encouraged the British government to stay and continue its sovereignty in Cyprus.

## **Conclusion**

The discussion above clearly showed that Britain would defend its privilege in Cyprus at any cost so that British dominance in the Middle East area could be preserved. However, the continuous movement for *enosis* by the Greek Cypriots presented a major danger to Britain’s position in Cyprus. Luckily for Britain, even though *enosis* was revitalised in 1945, became stronger at the end of 1946 and turned into a more unified movement in early 1947, the British government succeeded through these rough years without surrendering to the *enosis* demands by the Greek Cypriots and Greece.

This paper has analysed Britain’s decision in continuing its sovereignty in Cyprus from the perspective that has received less attention from previous historians – the local dynamics in Greece. As mentioned above, Cyprus was of substantial in keeping Britain’s

predominance in the Mediterranean area and also the Middle Eastern region. Considering this, it is understandable why previous historians have mostly focused on this issue and neglected other factors or perspectives.

It is worth reminding here that Bevin was the one who made the decision to retain British rule in Cyprus, and he was the one who initially championed the idea of returning Cyprus to Greece, even though he was fully aware that Cyprus was of great valuable to Britain in terms of geostrategic and security interest. It stands to reason then that there must be other factors that encouraged Bevin to change his decision towards Cyprus. As the decision to stay in Cyprus was made simultaneously to when Bevin was considering unfavourable local dynamics in Greece and the geostrategic importance of the Middle Eastern region as well as the Mediterranean area to Britain, this shows that the former matter – as argued by this paper – was another justification that had a great influence on Bevin and the Foreign Office's stance towards the future of Cyprus.

In brief, further archival research of British records, in particular Bevin's Private Papers of FO800, shows that Bevin's concern over the local dynamics in Greece – that it suffered from the Greek Civil War and was on the verge of becoming communist – had also influenced Bevin to reject *enosis*. If Cyprus was ceded to Greece during this crucial time, it was believed that Cyprus too would turn communist. This matter would endanger British possession of Cyprus, and also jeopardise British predominance in the Mediterranean area and the Middle Eastern region.

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### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> See Article I of the Cyprus Convention in George Hill, *A History of Cyprus: Vol. 4, The Ottoman Province, The British Colony 1571-1948*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952, p. 300. See also Joseph S. Joseph, 'Cyprus: Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Politics', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15:3-4, 2009, p. 377.

<sup>2</sup> Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1999, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> George H. Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, London: Greenwood Press, 1990, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59*, United States of America: University of Minnesota, 1997, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

- <sup>6</sup> Norasmahani Hussain, “The ‘Cyprus Question’ and Britain’s Decision to Leave Turkey and Greece outside NATO, 1948-1949”, *Sejarah*, 30:2, 2021, p. 105.
- <sup>7</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955–59*, p. 6.
- <sup>8</sup> Sir M. Rumbold to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 8 May 1922, FO371/7947.
- <sup>9</sup> Ian Stanley Ord Playfair, et al., *The Mediterranean and the Middle East: Volume III, British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb [September 1941 to September 1942]*, England: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 2004, p. 2.
- <sup>10</sup> Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, p. 43.
- <sup>11</sup> See Sir Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle*, London: Cassell & Company LTD, 1960, p. 534; see also Derek Varble, *The Suez Crisis 1956*, Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2003, p. 53.
- <sup>12</sup> Simon Ball, *The Bitter Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for the Mediterranean*, London: HarperPress, 2010, p. 96.
- <sup>13</sup> Palairt to Foreign Office, 19 December 1940, FO371/29846/R397.
- <sup>14</sup> Minute by Edward Warner, 16 January 1941, FO371/29846/R397.
- <sup>15</sup> Ball, *The Bitter Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for the Mediterranean*, p. 189.
- <sup>16</sup> Memorandum of Royal Institution for International Affairs, 17 April 1941, FO 371/23776/R4176.
- <sup>17</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: ‘Future of Cyprus’, 31 May 1941, FO371/29841/R5841/WP (41) 118. See also Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Colonies: ‘Future of Cyprus’, 31 May 1941, CO67/316/3/WP (41) 119.
- <sup>18</sup> Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, p. 31.
- <sup>19</sup> Churchill to Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941, PREM 3/113. See also Churchill to Foreign Secretary, 6 June 1941, CAB 66/16.
- <sup>20</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955–59*, p. 2.
- <sup>21</sup> Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, p. 68.
- <sup>22</sup> David R. Devereux, *The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East, 1948-56*, London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990, p. 2.
- <sup>23</sup> Attlee to the Chiefs of Staff, 22 February 1946, CAB 80/100, COS (46) 54 (0).
- <sup>24</sup> Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983, p. 41.
- <sup>25</sup> Memorandum by Orme G. Sargent, 8 September 1945, FO371/48344/R15384.
- <sup>26</sup> Defence Committee to the Chiefs of Staff, 5 September 1945, CAB 79/39, COS (45) 215.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup> Bullock, *Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, p. 171.
- <sup>30</sup> Bevin to Attlee, 14 January 1946, FO800/474/PM/46/4/Man/46/3. See also Aide Memoir by the Chiefs of Staff, CAB 80/99, COS (46) 45 (0), 13 February 1946; Aide Memoir by the Chiefs of Staff, 23 January 1947, DEFE 5/3, COS (47) 9th Meeting (0) Final.
- <sup>31</sup> Minute by Sir Arthur Dawe, 6 September 1945, CO 67/327/16.
- <sup>32</sup> Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Post-war Imperialism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 215-216.
- <sup>33</sup> Bevin to Hall, 17 September 1946, FO371/53761.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>36</sup> Hall to Bevin, 20 November 1945, FO371/48360. See also Hall to Bevin, 20 November 1945, CO 67/327.
- <sup>37</sup> Bevin to Hall, 4 December 1945, FO371/48360. See also Bevin to Hall, 4 December 1945, CO 67/327.
- <sup>38</sup> Hall to Cabinet Committees, 8 July 1946, CAB 128/6, CP (46) 260.
- <sup>39</sup> Minute by M. S. Williams, 9 April 1946, FO371/38760.
- <sup>40</sup> The Future Status of Cyprus, 8 July 1946, CAB 128/61, CM (46) 66th Meeting. See also Cabinet Committees Meeting, 8 July 1946, CO 537/1878.
- <sup>41</sup> Hansard, 23 October 1946, Vol. 427, London: H.M.S.O., 1946, pp. 396-397.
- <sup>42</sup> Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, p. 79.
- <sup>43</sup> Bevin to Hall, 18 September 1945, FO371/48360/R16295.
- <sup>44</sup> Minutes of conference between Bevin and Aghnidis by Frederick Warner to FO, 7 December 1946, FO371/58891/R18129.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>46</sup> Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955–59*, p. 8.
- <sup>47</sup> Minutes of conference between Bevin and Aghnidis by Frederick Warner to FO, 7 December 1946, FO371/58891/R18129.
- <sup>48</sup> Hansard, 20 August 1945, Vol. 413, London: H.M.S.O., 1945, p. 289. See also Foreign Office to Athens, 1 August 1945, FO800/468/Gre/45/1.

- <sup>49</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'Summary on the situation in Greece' (Drafts), 1 August 1945, FO371/48276/R13143.
- <sup>50</sup> Hansard, 20 August 1945, Vol. 413, p. 289.
- <sup>51</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'Summary on the situation in Greece' (Drafts), 1 August 1945, FO371/48276/R13143.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup> Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-47*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 89.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 83.
- <sup>55</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'Review of Soviet Policy', 5 January 1948, CAB 129/23, CP (48) 7. See also Norasmahani Hussain and Zulkanain Abdul Rahman, "Peranan Britain dalam menubuhkan Pertubuhan Perjanjian Atlantik Utara (NATO) pada 1949", *Sejarah*, 26:1, 2017, p. 99.
- <sup>56</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'Policy towards Greece and Turkey', 25 January 1947, CAB 129/16, CP (47) 34.
- <sup>57</sup> See Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, p. 91.
- <sup>58</sup> Defence Committee, 'Greece: Previous Reference: DO (46) 9th Meeting, Minute 5', 3 March 1947, CAB 131/5, DO (47) 6th Meeting.
- <sup>59</sup> Francis Williams, *Ernest Bevin: Portrait of A Great Englishman*, London: Hutchinson, 1952, p. 263.
- <sup>60</sup> Notes of the Meeting, 7 February 1947, FO371/67081/R2360. See also Arthur Creech Jones to Cypriot Delegation, 25 February 1947, FO371/68071/R2527.
- <sup>61</sup> Conclusions, 18 March 1947, FO371/68082/R13855, CM (47).
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid., pp. 79-80.
- <sup>64</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960", *The Journal of Military History*, 73:4, 2009, pp. 1148-1149.
- <sup>65</sup> Note by the War Office: Sovereignty of Cyprus – Background, 24 April 1951, DEFE 5/31, COS (51) 245.
- <sup>66</sup> Minute by Air Ministry to COS Committee: Cyprus-Strategic Requirements of a Very Heavy Bomber Airfield, 9 April 1948, DEFE 2/1654, COS (48) 70th Meeting.

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