

## MUSLIM WILLS IN PENANG

In *Ong Cheng Neo v. Yeap Cheah Neoh and others*<sup>1</sup> Sir Montague Smith in giving the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said that in considering what was the law applicable to the bequests dealt with in that case in the Straits Settlements it was necessary to refer shortly to their history. He said —

“The first Charter relating to Penang was granted by George III in 1807 to the East India Company. It cited that the Company had “obtained by cession from a native prince “Prince of Wales Island and a tract of the country in the Peninsular of Malacca, opposite that island”, that when the cession was made, the island was wholly uninhabited but the Company built a Fort and Town, and that many of our subjects and many Chinese, Malays, Indians and other persons professing different religions and using and having different manners, habits, customs and persuasions had settled there”. The Charter made provision for the government of the Island and the administration of justice there. It established a Court of Judicature which was to exercise all the jurisdiction of the English courts of law and chancery, as far as the circumstances will admit. The court was also to exercise jurisdiction as an Ecclesiastical Court, so far as the several religions, manners and customs of the inhabitants will admit.

A new Charter was granted by George IV in 1826 when the Island of Singapore and the town and fort of Malacca were annexed to Prince of Wales' Island which conferred in substance the same jurisdiction on the Court of Judicature as the former Charter had done.

The last Charter granted to the East India Company in the year 1855, again conferred the like powers on the Court; and this jurisdiction was not altered in its fundamental conditions by the Act of the 29th and 30th Vict. C.99 and the Order of the Queen in Council made in pursuance of it, by which the

<sup>1</sup>(1872). 1 Ky. 326.

Straits Settlements were placed under the government of Her Majesty as part of the colonial possessions of the Crown nor by Ordinance No. 5 of 1868 constituting the present Supreme Court.

With reference to that history it is really immaterial to consider whether Prince of Wales Island or as it is called Penang, should be regarded as ceded or newly settled territory, for there is no trace of any laws having been established there before it was acquired by the East India Company. In either view the law of England must be taken to be the governing law, so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of the place and modified in its application by those circumstances. This would be the case in a country newly settled by subjects of the British Crown; and in their Lordships's view, the Charters referred to, if they are to be regarded as having introduced the law of England into the Colony contain in the words "so far as circumstances will admit", the same qualification. In applying this general principle, it has been held that statutes relating to matters and exigencies peculiar to the local condition of England and which are not adapted to the circumstances of a particular Colony, do not become a part of its law although the general law of England may be introduced into it."

Earlier in the case of *The Goods of Abdullah*<sup>2</sup> the Supreme Court in Penang had already held that a Muslim in Penang may by will alienate the whole of his property and such alienation will be good *pro tanto* though contrary to the Muslim law. In that case it appeared that one Abdullah had made a will which professed to pass the whole of his property and under it one Growk was given a part of the property. Letters of administration had been granted to the widow of the deceased and an application was made to set aside the grant and to admit the will to probate. Malkin R. held that "(1)t would be sufficient for the decision of the present case to observe that the will is only at variance with the rules of the Mohamedan law, in as much as it professes to pass the whole property, and by that law the power of the testator to bequeath his property extends only to cover a third part of it. As to that third part, the testator has not exceeded his power; and the will is at all

<sup>2</sup>(1835) 2 Ky. Ec. 8.

events good *pro tanto*". However, the learned Recorder went on to consider the powers of a Muslim in Penang to dispose of his property by will. "Though not necessary to the disposal of the present application" he said that the expression of his views might prevent the parties from having recourse to further litigation. He referred to his decision in the case of *Rodyk v. Williamson*<sup>3</sup> in Malacca, where he had held that he was bound by "the uniform course of authority to hold that the introduction of the King's charter into these Settlements had introduced the existing law of England also except in some cases where it was modified by express provision, and had abrogated any law previously existing". In *Rodyk v. Williamson* Malkin R had decided against the continuance of the Dutch law at Malacca. In the case of the *Goods of Abdullab* he said that the Muslim law in Penang could stand on no better footing, unless by the express provisions of the Charter. He then said —

"It may be worthwhile however before adverting to the terms of the Charter, to observe that although the Mahometan law cannot, independently of them, stand on a better footing here than the Dutch law in Malacca, it can very easily stand on a worse. To place it on the same, it would be necessary to prove that it existed, not as the custom of a particular portion of the inhabitants but as the law of the place up to the time of the First Charter. I believe it would be very difficult to prove the existence of any definite system of law applying to Prince of Wales Island or Province Wellesley previous to their occupation by the English; but that law, whatever it was, would be the only law entitled to the same consideration as the Dutch law at Malacca; indeed even that would not in general policy, though it might in strict legal argument, for there might be much hardship in depriving the settled inhabitants of Malacca of a system which they had long understood and enjoyed, but none in requiring the persons who resorted to these new and almost uninhabited districts (for such they were when we got them) to conform as all settlers must, unless there is an express exception in their favour, to the law of the land thus settled in". Malkin R. then examined the terms of the Charter and concluded that "in the general expression, the Charter seems to have intended

<sup>3</sup>The original judgment has been lost.

to give a certain degree of protection and indulgence to the various natives resorting here; not very clearly defined, yet perhaps, easily enough applied in particular cases, but not generally to sanction or recognise their law". He concluded "It may be desirable to call to notice that it is the fault of native holders of property if any inconvenience results from the present decision, supposing it to be established as law. The law to which I consider them as subject, gives the most unlimited freedom of disposal of property by will; and any man therefore who wishes his possessions to devolve according to the Mahometan, Chinese or other law, has only to make his will to that effect and the court will be bound to ascertain that law and apply it for him".

In *Fatimah and others v. Logan and others*<sup>4</sup> a petition had been filed by Fatimah, who claimed to be the widow of the late Mohamed Noordin, Tengah Chee Mah his daughter and the husband of the latter against the executors and the persons interested under the will of the late Mohamed Noordin, a Muslim who died in Penang on 12th April 1870. The object of the petition was to obtain a decree of the court declaring that the deceased died intestate as to all such portion of his movable and immovable property as may be found to be disposed of or attempted to be disposed of, in a way contrary to the law of England or contrary to the Mohamedan law, if the court held the latter law was in force in the settlement of Penang in the case of Muslims, and that the estate and effects of the deceased may be distributed under the decree of the court so far as the will may be found inconsistent with the English or the Mohamedan law, according to the rules of the English or Mohamedan law. The Attorney-General appearing for the plaintiffs maintained two propositions, first that previous to the Charter of 1807 Mohamedan law was in force in Penang; and secondly that the Charter made no alteration in the law in this respect. Hackett J. rejected both propositions as untenable. He expressed his opinion "that either on the settlement of the island or if not then by the Charter of 1807, the law of England was introduced into Penang and became the law of the land, and that all who settled here became subject to that law." "It is

<sup>4</sup>(1871) 1 Ky. 255.



scarcely necessary to add" he said "that our charters contain no provisions corresponding to those of the Indian Charter, which confers certain privileges on Mohamedans and Gentoos and therefore there is no ground to hold them exempt from subjection to the law of the place. It follows from what I have said that inasmuch as English law has prevailed in Penang certainly ever since the publication of the First Charter in 1807 and Mohamed Noordin was domiciled here at the time of the making of his will and up to the time of his death, that his capacity to make a will must be decided not by Mohamedan law but by the *lex loci*, which here is the law of England as it has been modified by the Indian and Colonial Legislatures".

In *Reg. v. Willans*<sup>5</sup> Maxwell R. had decided that "whatever law the second Charter introduced into Malacca was introduced into every part of the settlement; and as it has been decided that the law of England as it stood in 1826 was brought by it into Malacca I am of opinion that the same law became, by the same means, the law of Penang". In 1956 however the Civil Law Ordinance was enacted and by section 3 of the Ordinance it was provided — "Save insofar as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written law in force in the Federation or in any part thereof, the Court shall apply the common law of England and the rules of equity as administered in England at the date of coming into force of this Ordinance:

Provided always that the said common law and the rules of equity shall be applied so far only as the circumstances of the States and Settlements comprised in the Federation and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary."

The Muslims Ordinance<sup>6</sup> provides that the estate and effects of Muslims dying intestate after 1st January 1924 shall be administered according to the Muslim law, except in so far as such law is opposed to any local custom which prior to 1st January 1924 had the force of law; but any next of kin who is not a Muslim shall be entitled to share in the distribution as though he were a Muslim.

<sup>5</sup>(1858) 3 Ky. 16.

<sup>6</sup>Cap. 57 of the 1936 Edition of the Laws of the Straits Settlements.

There were no restrictions on the testamentary powers of a Muslim in Penang before 1956. The Civil Law Act, 1956,<sup>7</sup> does not appear to have changed the position nor has the Wills Ordinance, 1959,<sup>8</sup> for that Ordinance in terms "does not apply to the wills of persons professing the Muslim religion whose testamentary powers shall remain unaffected by anything in this Ordinance contained".

Section 100 of the Evidence Ordinance 1950<sup>9</sup> provided that nothing in Sections 91 to 99 of the Ordinance shall affect the construction of wills, but in the Settlements or either of them they shall be construed according to the rules of construction which would be applicable thereto if they were being construed in a Court of Justice in England. This section is substantially re-enacted in the Evidence Act, 1950<sup>10</sup> where it reads as follows:

"Nothing in section 91 to 99 shall affect the construction of wills, but in the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah and Sarawak or any of them they shall, subject to any written law, be construed according to the rules of construction which would be applicable thereto if they were being construed in a Court of Justice in England".

The Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959,<sup>11</sup> of Penang repeals the Muslim Ordinance, but with the exception of Parts I and III. It is also provided that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may from time to time by Proclamation in the Gazette, after consultation with the Governor in Council, amend or repeal any of the provisions of Part I and III of the Muslims Ordinance. So far no proclamation has been issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

There appears therefore to be no legislation in Penang to alter the law as it existed prior to 1956 and the case of *In the goods of Abdullah (supra)* may still be followed. It might be noted that the decision can only apply where the deceased is domiciled in Penang or where the immoveable property is

<sup>7</sup>Act 67.

<sup>8</sup>No. 38 of 1959.

<sup>9</sup>No. 11 of 1950.

<sup>10</sup>Act 56.

<sup>11</sup>No. 3 of 1959.

situated in Penang, as pointed out by Taylor J. in *Re Syed Hassan bin Abdulla Aljofri deceased*<sup>12</sup>. In the case of *The Estate of Sutachi binte Koopay Kader*<sup>13</sup> (See Appendix) the Court heard the expert evidence of the then Chief Kathi of Penang, Haji Ahmad Maliki, and of Tuan Haji C.M. Yusoff. In that case Hepworth J. granted probate of the will to the Petitioners.

In the case of *In the Estate of Shaikh Mobamed bin Abdul Rahman bin Hasim*<sup>14</sup> the court had to consider the validity of a bequest of 2/18 equal share in the residuary estate to a granddaughter of the deceased. The case turned on the question of fact as to whether the deceased wife of the applicant was the granddaughter of the deceased and the court decided that she was and that the marriage between her and the applicant was valid. Chang Min Tat J. however stated "Finally it is to be noted that this will being the disposition of all the assets of a Muslim to strangers in the sense of persons who are not according to the Muslim law of distribution heirs, is by this law a valid disposition". It appeared to be assumed that the Muslim law would be applicable to determine the validity of the distribution but the point did not appear to have been argued.

As stated above; section 172(3) of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, of Penang provides that the Yang di Pertuan Agong may from time to time by Proclamation published in the Gazette, after consultation with the Governor in Council, amend or repeal any of the provisions of Parts I and III of the Muslims Ordinance. So far no proclamation has been issued by the Yang di Pertuan Agung and it is suggested that this be done. Part I of the Muslims Ordinance deals with registration, for which there is adequate provision in Part VI of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment. Part III of the Muslims Ordinance deals with the Effect of Marriage on Property and contains many provisions which are in conflict with the Islamic Law. For example, section 27 gives a non-Muslim a right to a share in the estate of a Muslim; section 32 gives a Muslim married woman the power to dispose of her

<sup>12</sup>[1959] M.L.J. 198.

<sup>13</sup>Probate No. 261 of 1962.

<sup>14</sup>[1974] 1 M.L.J. 184.

property by will; and section 40 applies the English Law relating to voluntary settlements.

It might be noted that in Singapore section 105 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act expressly provides that "Notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of the English law or in any other written law no Muslim domiciled in Singapore, shall after the coming into operation of this Act, dispose of his property by will except in accordance with the provisions of and subject to the restrictions imposed by the School of Muslim law professed by him". There should be similar legislation in Penang.

Ahmad Ibrahim

#### Annexure

16th January, 1963

*Petition for Probate No. 261 of 1962.*

In the Estate of Sutachi binti Koopay Kader  
alias Hajjah Satachi binti Kope Kadir, deceased.

Fatimah binti Kopay Kadir & 2 or. ...

Mohamed Salleh bin Abdul Rahman ...

*Petitioners.*

*Caveator.*

*Sir Husein Abdoolcader* for Petitioners

*Mr. M. Abraham* for Caveator.

*Sir Husein Abdoolcader:*

Petition filed 3.10.62

Affidavit of due execution of Will, 3.10.62

Deceased died on 14.9.62.

On 6.10.62 Caveat filed on behalf of husband of deceased.

On 30.10.62 Mr. Abraham became Solicitor for Caveator.

On 30.10.62 warning to caveat under Rule 36(7) issued.

On 10.11.62 appearance entered for Caveator under Rule 36(9).

Caveator husband of deceased and as such entitled to share under Muslim Law in spite of the Will of 16.4.60.

On 29.11.62 adjourned by Senior Assistant Registrar to Judge.

On 14.12.62 in Chambers by consent adjourned under Rule 37(9) to open Court to be dealt with summarily.

Rule 37(2) gives Court's powers.



Purely question of law.

Onus on Mr. Abraham to prove that Estate distributable in accordance with Muslim Law in spite of the Will.

*Mr. Abraham:*

Agrees subject to one or two comments.

Refers Warning dated 30.10.62

Appearance to Warning filed 10.11.62.

Appearance to paragraph (1) of Warning.

Agrees it is for him to begin.

Caveator is entitled to his share according to Muslim Law of two-thirds of Estate.

Deceased only entitled to will away one-third.

Wills Ordinance, 1959 (No. 38 of 1959).

Section 2(2), Wills of Muslims not affected.

Wills Ordinance of Straits Settlements repealed in Section 31 of Wills Ordinance, 1959.

Wills of Muslims entirely governed by Muslim Law.

On that evidence is to be given by Chief Kathi, State of Penang.

D.W. 1 – Haji Ahmad Maliki, affirmed, states in Malay:

I am Chief Kathi, State of Penang and Province Wellesley.

I am Officer-in-Charge of Department of Religious Affairs, Penang.

I have been Chief Kathi about 2 years.

I remember receiving a written request from Mohamed Salleh bin Abdul Rahman for a report as to a Will made by one Madam Sutachi binti Koopay Kadir, deceased.

It was in Romanised Malay.

(*Sir Husein Abdoolcader* asks for his expert witness to listen to this expert witness.

Mr. Abraham – no objection.

Tuan Haji G.M. Yusoff comes into Court)

I replied to that request. I produce my reply in Romanised Malay and a translation in English. (Original admitted as "D. 1" and translation as "D. 1-T").

(Referred to paragraph 2(ii)(A) of "D. 1"). My authority is Jammal Manhaj written by Sheikh Suleiman.

(Refers to page 49 of this authority). It is in Arabic. It says only one-third of the property can be willed away.

(Says he cannot say if this is applicable here).

(Referred to paragraph 2(ii)(B) of "D. 1"). A Muslim cannot will away property to a beneficiary.

A deceased person cannot will away his or her property to a beneficiary when already this beneficiary is entitled to get his or her share. The book I have referred to is not authority for this.

When I said only one-third of the property can be willed away, I meant to persons other than beneficiaries according to Muslim Law.

(Referred to the Will). A husband is entitled to get a share of the wife's property.

If deceased wife leaves a husband and children surviving her, the husband's share depends on the number of male and female children.

(The Will shows 3 sisters, 1 nephew, and 3 nieces).

(This nephew and these 3 nieces are the children of one of the sisters).

The husband will get  $\frac{9}{21}$  shares of the property.

(Now says) According to Muslim Law a husband is entitled to get a half share.

(I put it to witness that in "D. 1" he said the husband was entitled to  $\frac{9}{21}$ , and the three sisters  $\frac{4}{21}$  each.

How does he reconcile this with his statement that husband is entitled to a half?).

These three sisters of the deceased are entitled to  $\frac{2}{3}$ rd share of the property, and the husband to half.

(I say this cannot be so as this is more than 1).

I divide the property into six portions and since the husband gets half he gets 3 and the other beneficiaries get  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the property,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of six is 4. 4 and 3 become 7. Since the husband gets 3 shares and the 3 females get 4 shares it is hard to distribute 4 shares among 3 persons, so I multiply 4 by 3 and it becomes 12 shares and multiply 3 by 3 and it becomes 9, so I add the 9 and the 12 together and make it 21 and then the husband gets  $\frac{9}{21}$  and the sisters  $\frac{12}{21}$ .

*Cross-examined by Sir Husein Abdoolcader:*

I am temporary Chief Kathi.

I know Tuan Haji G.M. Yusoff.

He is now the President of the Religious Affairs Department and President of the Religious Affairs Council.

He resigned in 1962 on making his second visit to Mecca.

He is experienced in Muslim affairs.

He also knows the Muslim Law.

I do not know the existing Muslim Law in Penang relating to Muslim wills.

I do know the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, but I do not understand it. I could understand it if it was in Malay.

I know it was drafted by Tuan Haji G.M. Yusoff and Mr. Justice Suffian.

(Referred to Section 172(2) of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959). I am not aware of this.

(Refers Muslims Ordinance (Straits Settlements Chapter 57, Part III, Section 32). I am not aware of this.

I have seen a copy of the Will.

(Referred to section 26(3) of Muslims Ordinance). This will was read to me.

I do not know the Law as to Estates of Muslims in the Malay States.

I cannot say if Muslim Law affects the Wills made in Penang.

I do not know that prior to 1st January, 1924, the intestate Estates of Muslims were administered according to English Law (Section 27).

If Tuan Haji G.M. Yusoff goes into the witness box and says this Will is not subject to Muslim Law I would agree.

*No re-examination.*

This witness may know something about Muslim Law, although I am not convinced of that, but he certainly does not know whether or not it is applicable in the State of Penang, and, if it is, to what extent. I cannot regard him as an expert witness.

Mr. Abraham says it is a question of law and it might be as well to hear the other expert witness before arguing the law.

Sir Husein Abdoolcader has no objection but wishes to address the Court on the law before calling his witness.

*Sir Husein Abdoolcader:*

Royal Charter of 1807 introduced English Law into Penang.  
 Refers Braddell's Laws of Straits Settlements at pages 4 and 14.  
 Refers 6, P.C.C., 381 — *Yeap v. Ong*.  
 Refers Straits Law Reports, page 16 — In the Goods of Abdullah  
 Mallal's Digest of Malayan Case Law, 2nd Edition, pages  
 630 paragraph 2729; page 899 paragraph 3776.  
 Straits Settlements Laws, Chapter 57.  
 Muslims (Titles and Construction) Ordinance, 1952 — Section 3.  
 Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959 — Section 172(2)  
 Part III of Muslims Ordinance (Chapter 57), Section 26(2) and (3)  
 Nothing in the Will saying deceased's estate to be admin-  
 istered according to Muslim Law.

Section 27.

Section 32.

Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, Volume 16,  
 page 172, paragraph 283.

In Singapore it was suggested Muslim Law should be  
 applied to testate dispositions. But this met with opposition.  
 The Law was however varied (1962, M.L.J. 374).

No such provision in Penang as Section 41 of Singapore  
 Ordinance.

Under Muslim Law can only dispose of one-third of  
 Estate, and not to his heirs.

— Haji Mohamed Yusoff, *affirmed, states in English:*

I live at 6, Tavoy Road, Penang.

I am a Justice of the Peace, Penang.

I am a Government pensioner.

I was in the Judicial Department for 36 years.

I was District Officer, Butterworth and Collector of Land  
 Revenue in the Military and Civil Administration.

I retired in April, 1958.

When I retired I was an Assistant Public Trustee and  
 also Assistant Official Administrator in Penang.



Prior to that I acted a Senior Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court, Penang, twice.

After my retirement, I was re-engaged by Government in 1959 as President of Religious Affairs Department, Penang, and concurrently President of the Religious Affairs Council, Penang.

I resigned in March, 1962 to go on my second pilgrimage to Mecca.

I also went to the Middle East.

(Referred to the 1959 Enactment). I know Mr. Justice Suffian. I drafted this Enactment with him.

I have studied the Muslim law distribution in the course of my official duties.

(Referred to D. 1). I see this Certificate. This is a correct statement of distribution under pure Muslim law.

If a Muslim dies in Penang leaving a Will Muslim law does not apply to property in the State of Penang.

The distribution will take place in accordance with the terms of the Will.

If he wanted his Estate administered according to Muslim law it would have to be so stated in the Will.

Chapter 57's title has been changed to the Muslims Ordinance. Parts I and III of that Ordinance still in force.

Part III deals with the Wills of married women.

In the case of intestacy the law was changed with effect from 1.1.24 by the Muslims Ordinance.

When I was Assistant Public Trustee and Assistant Official Administrator I dealt with several Muslim Estates.

When there was a Will distribution was in accordance with its terms.

When there was no Will I follow the Muslim Ordinance.

(Referred to Will). This Will is in order in the State of Penang. It has been duly attested.

*Cross-examined by Mr. Abraham:*

The 1959 Enactment refers to the administration of Muslim law and not to Muslim law itself.

If questions of Muslim law are involved I would look in text books relating to the subject.

Chapter 57 says married women may dispose of their own property by Will.

In my opinion there is no limit to this.

Pure Muslim law limits the disposal to one-third. That does not apply here because the common law of the State is not Muslim law.

There is a Wills Ordinance, 1959, which applies throughout the Federation.

(Referred to Section 2(2) of Wills Ordinance, 1959). In my opinion this does not apply in Penang as it does not supersede the provisions of Chapter 57. It strengthens the provisions of Chapter 57.

As far as Wills are concerned it applies in Penang.

(Refers Section 2(2)). The testamentary powers in the Federation as regards Muslims would be found in Muslim law.

There is no Ordinance affecting the Wills of persons professing the Muslim religion throughout the Federation.

In Penang provision has been made under Part III of the Muslims Ordinance, Chapter 57.

*No re-examination.*

*Sir Husein Abdoolcader:*

Refers to Section 3 of the Married Women Ordinance, 1957, also Section 4(a).

Both witnesses released.

Adjourned at 1.00 p.m.

Resumed at 2.30 p.m.

*Sir Hussein Abdoolcader:*

Probate should be granted to the three Petitioners.

Muslim law not apply in case of Muslim Wills in State of Penang.

Lex loci of Penang was English law introduced by Royal Charter in 1807 and subsequent Charters.

Onus on Caveator. Onus not discharged.

Hopeless expert witness for Caveator.

If Caveator right no need for Singapore legislation.

Only applies to testate Estates.

Wills Ordinance, 1959, makes Caveator's case worse.

Mr. Abraham:

Caveator not against sealing of grant but asking for distributive share.

In pure Muslim law, Muslim can only will away one-third.

Refers *In the Goods of Abdullab*.

Section 32 of Muslims Ordinance has to be read in conjunction with Muslim law which limits disposal to one-third.

Will only good pro tanto, that is for one-third.

Court can order who will apply for Letters of Administration with Will annexed.

I give short oral judgment.

Probate of the Will granted to the Petitioners as prayed.

*Sir Husein Abdoolcader* asks for costs against Caveator.


*Mr. Abraham* says Caveator not opposing grant of Probate, merely asking for distributive share.

Costs should be out of the Estate.

Petitioners' costs of these proceedings to be paid by Caveator.

(Signed) T.R. HEPWORTH,  
JUDGE.

16th January, 1963.





## LEGISLATION

The following list of Acts passed and revised in Malaysia is a continuation of the list of Federal Acts contained in Vol. 5, Part 2 [1978] J.M.C.L.

### FEDERAL ACTS PASSED

<i>Bil. Akta/ Act No.</i>	<i>Tajuk Ringkas/Short Title</i>
216	Akta Darurat (Kuasa-kuasa Perlu) 1979. Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979.
217	Akta Pengisytiharan Suatu Kawasan Dalam Daerah Bintulu Menjadi Port Persekutuan, 1979. Declaration of an Area in the Bintulu District to be a Federal Port Act 1979.
218	Akta Penyelidikan dan Kemajuan Minyak Kelapa Sawit, 1979. Palm Oil Research and Development Act, 1979.
219	Akta Kewangan (Duti Harta Pesaka), 1979. Finance (Estate Duty) Act, 1979.

### FEDERAL ACTS REVISED

<i>Bil. Akta/ Act No.</i>	<i>Tajuk Ringkas/Short Title</i>
119	Akta Suruhanjaya Siasatan, 1950 (Disemak — 1973) Publication of the national language text.
201	Akta Duti Pertaruhan dan Ambiltangan, 1948 (Disemak — 1978) Publication of the national language text.